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PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN TRANSITIONAL SITUATIONS 
 
Clem Tisdell, Department of Economics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, 4072, 
Australia 
 
1. Introduction 
The occurrence of high levels of pollution and often serious environmental degradation in 
centrally planned economics is well documented (Cf. Pryde, 1972; Zylicz, 1994; Kallaste, 1994) 
even though its presence has sometimes been exaggerated in Western countries for political 
reasons  (Cf. Vari and Tamas, 1993).  Most of the previously centrally planned communist-
dominated economies are in varied stages of transition to market economies and/or to more open 
economies politically.  The nature and stages of their transition processes vary greatly and this 
variation has implications for their ability to protect their environments in transition. 
 
While some economic theorists were highly optimistic about the ability of former centrally 
planned economies (CPEs) to transform themselves into market economies quickly, reality has 
proven to be somewhat different.  In particular,  advocates (mainly from Harvard University and 
within the IMF) of a >big-bang= transformation for the Russian economy may have helped 
create an economic (and social) tragedy.  Russia has not progressed but has gone backwards in 
terms of economic output (World Bank, 1998).  This is mainly due to a failure of policy-advisers 
to understand that market systems only work or work well when they are complemented by 
supporting institutions and social values.  These cannot as a rule be created instantaneously but 
must evolve.  While the process might be accelerated, institution-building appears to be more of 
an organic than a technical process limited by cultural background and experiences and requiring 
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care, compassion and empathy if it is to be a success.  In Western countries some such 
institutions have taken centuries to evolve.  In this respect, China=s evolutionary approach 
contrasts with the >big-bang= attempts of Russia to bring about economic transformation.  I shall 
return to the varied transitional processes later. 
 
Before doing so, consider some simple economic theory of the relationship between the level of 
national production and levels of pollution and influences on pollution of the existence or 
absence of markets. 
 
2. Kuznets Environmental Development Curves 
It is widely believed that levels of pollution emissions relative to GDP at first rise with GDP 
eventually peak and then decline.  Thus when pollution  intensity (the index of pollution 
emissions divided by GDP) is graphed in relation to GDP the resultant curve is of an inverted U-
shape often called a Kuznets environmental curve (Barbier, 1997). 
 
This relationship provides a rather optimistic scenario for the control of pollution.  It suggests 
that while economic growth at first increases pollution intensities, in the long-term, it reduces 
levels of pollution intensity.  Thus it suggests that pollution and environmental degradation may 
be a result of insufficient economic growth rather than too much economic growth.  Despite the 
need for qualifications of this thesis (Cf. Tisdell, 1993), it appears to have widespread support Β 
for example, by the World Bank (1992). 
 
Given that this Kuznets relationship is valid, its consequences for CPEs engaging in transition 
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will vary.  To the extent that transition makes greater economic growth possible for former 
CPEs, their pollution intensities can rise or fall depending upon whether they are below or above 
the peak of their Kuznets curve.  If they are below this peak, pollution intensities can be 
expected to rise or rise initially as a consequence of their economic growth. 
 
However, the above assumes that the same Kuznets curve applies to a CPE as to a transformed 
CPE.  This is not very likely.  Evidence indicates that pollution emissions for the same level of 
GDP are likely to be lower in market economies than in CPEs.  Zylicz (1984, p.89) supports this 
by comparing the waste and pollution intensities of six Central and Eastern European countries 
with the European Community at the end of the 1980s.  Andrews (1993) found high intensities of 
pollution in  Czechoslovakia relative to comparable market economies.  This was mainly 
because of inefficient use of fuel in Czechoslovakia, and its forced concentration on heavy 
industries and its use of very poor local fuels, such as lignite, high in sulphur content.  Thus after 
successful transition the Kuznets environmental curves for former CPEs could move down.  
There would then be a bonus in terms of pollution control for former CPEs. 
 
Possibly a diagram will help to clarify the situation.  In a >normally= operating CPE, its Kuznets 
environmental curve might be as indicated by curve FGHKL in Figure 1 compared to curve 
ABCDE in a >normally= operating market economy.  Thus if the CPE was prior to transition at 
point G and attained instant transition without growth, the economy would move from G to B 
and its pollution levels would fall.  But if transition is accompanied by economic growth so 
income per head rises from y1 to y1Ν the extra growth results in greater levels of pollution.  On 
the other hand, if the CPE is at a point such as GΝ  prior to its transformation, instantaneous 
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transformation accompanied by economic growth (rising GDP per capita) could reduce pollution 
intensities.  For example, a movement from GΝ to C or D obviously has this impact.  However, 
as discussed in the next section, transformation from a CPE is by no means instantaneous or 
smooth.  The transitional stage is not normal so results are not confined to Αnormal≅ 
relationships.  Indeed, in the transformation process pollution intensities and adverse 
environmental impacts may exceed normal bounds due to institutional problems as discussed 
below.  Thus in Figure 1,  an economy initially at G may move above the broken line FGΝHL to 
a point say like GΟ in the transformation stage.  This indicates the occurrence of negative 
economic growth plus rising pollution intensities.  This could well have happened in Russia. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
Reasons why the Kuznets pollution curve is likely to be higher in CPEs than in market 
economies include the following:- 
(i) Poor allocation methods (due to the absence of markets and failure to use price 
mechanism as an allocative device) add to resource-use per unit of output in CPEs.  This 
results in more resources being >wasted= or if pollution is a positive function of 
resource-use, there is generation of greater pollution per unit of output, other things 
equal; 
(ii) Managerial inefficiency in CPEs and failure to adopt technologies or develop 
technologies which economise on resource-use further adds to the problem.  Those 
managing enterprises have little economic incentive to economise and develop and adopt 
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new technologies; 
(iii) Social factors also play a role.  Stalinism emphasised material production as a source of 
wealth, ignoring the importance of the service industries including the significance of 
environmental services.  Economic structures were distorted in favour of heavy industries 
which were also highly polluting industries; 
(iv) State-owned enterprises were often in a position to use political power to avoid 
compliance with environmental regulations or block their introduction.  Environmental 
protection ministries were politically weak compared with production ministries; 
(v) The international trade of CPEs was, for the most part restricted to trade with communist 
countries and often resulted in the availability only of highly polluting fuels and 
resources, for example the use of coal high in particulate matter and sulphur. 
 
In addition, compared to Western market economies, former CPEs were not open political 
societies supportive of free speech and did not have a free civil society.  Therefore, political 
counterbalances to environmental excesses, common in Western societies, were absent.  To the 
extent that market systems are associated with greater personal freedom and with democratic 
institutions, they can harness extra social pressure to control social excesses from pollution (Cf. 
Tisdell, 1993, Ch. 2).  
 
However, as mentioned above, scenario-modeling which compares CPEs with fully transformed 
CPEs, that is their final desired state, is much too simple because it ignores the process of 
transition which may be long and drawn out with the ever present possibility of reversion to the 
past.  As Keynes (1936) wryly remarked, if we concentrate on the long-run or long-run 
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equilibrium, we are all liable to be dead.  Since transitional processes can take a long time, 
transitional states do matter from a social point of view.  They are worthy of special 
consideration; as many evolutionary economists stress (Kornai, 1971) several of whom claim 
that economic systems are perpetually in a state of flux.  With this in mind, let us consider 
difficulties which arise in protecting the environment in former CPEs during their transitional 
phase. 
 
3. Difficulties of Protecting the Environment in Transitional Situations 
The institutional experience and the process of transition of all former CPEs is not the same.  
Consequently, although all former CPEs experience transitional difficulties, these often differ 
and their transitional environmental problems sometimes originate in unlike ways.  Thus the 
experiences of China, Russia and the Czech Republic, in transition, are by no means the same.  
Because of the severe social and economic disruption which Russia has experienced in its 
transition, it seems likely that its pollution intensity  has risen in relation to its GDP.  Although 
its GDP has fallen considerably (World Bank, 1998), pollution emissions do not appear to have 
fallen proportionately.  It may have moved from a position like GΝ to one like GΟ in Figure 1.  
On the other hand, China commencing from a less developed status, appears to have strategies in 
place to systematically reduce its pollution, its intensities of pollution and the extent of 
environmental degradation brought about by its economic growth.  Thus China may be moving 
along the arrow GBΝ in Figure 1. 
 
Ironically, one of the major problems that Russia faces in reducing pollution intensities is its 
failure to achieve economic growth since beginning its reforms.  The Russian Federation 
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experienced negative growth of GDP in each of the years 1993-97 with a negative growth rate 
for its Gross Domestic Investment present over a longer period (World Bank, 1998).   Former 
CPEs experiencing either lack of economic growth or a decline in economic activity can find it 
difficult to reduce pollution intensities for the following reasons:- 
(i) New and modern equipment and methods generally use resources more efficiently than 
older and obsolete ones.  There is less waste in relation to input of materials with new 
and/or technologically advanced equipment.  However, in economies which fail to grow, 
there is usually little new investment, as seems to be so in Russia.  Consequently, existing 
equipment cannot be replaced, becomes of older age and obsolete; 
(ii) In an ailing economy, apart from the retention of old plant and equipment, existing plant 
and equipment are unlikely to be well maintained.  This adds to technical inefficiency in 
economic activity and as such results in greater waste in relation to output which in the 
end translates into more pollution; 
(iii) In an ailing economy, businesses may be forced to adopt desperate measures to survive.  
For example, illegal discharge of toxic substances may become common.  Laws cannot 
be enforced.  There is a high risk of this in Russia where lawlessness appears to have 
increased in the transitional phase; 
(iv) Lack of maintenance of plant and equipment due to financial exigencies increases the risk 
of environmental disasters eg. rupturing of oil pipelines as has occurred in Russia with 
serious environmental consequences; 
(v) In difficult economic circumstances, there is likely to be political reluctance to enforce 
pollution or environmental regulations for fear of job losses.  Short-term economic 
survival tends to take priority over long-term social and economic goals.  Basic and 
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immediate wants are given priority over higher wants in circumstances of this nature 
(Maslow, 1997).  Surveys indicate that Russian society has not shifted from materialism 
to post-materialism (Doktorov et al., 1993) and neither has the Bulgarian (Genov, 1993; 
Vari and Tamas, 1993, p.4). 
 
The upshot of the above is that economic failure often brings with it failure to protect the 
environment effectively.  This is not to say that economic growth cannot adversely impact on the 
environment.  However, economic growth can provide the means to deal with environmental 
problems, may strengthen the will of a population to do so and in as much as new equipment 
tends to be technically more efficient and so on, economic growth provides a bonus by reducing 
wastes from economic activity.  Furthermore, as economies grow the comparative size of their 
service industries expand in relation to their total production and the relative importance of 
heavy polluting industries usually declines. 
 
Thus the ability of former CPEs to achieve or accelerate economic growth in their transitional 
phase is relevant to their ability to address effectively their pollution and environmental 
problems.  Consequently in transition, Russia has been less able to address its environmental 
difficulties than China.  But lack of economic growth is not the only possible difficulty that can 
be encountered in protecting the environment in transitional situations. 
 
In the early stages of transition, euphoria may exist about the socio-economic potential of market 
systems.  This can result in market advocates being blind to the possibility of market failures 
such as the presence of unfavourable environmental externalities (Cf. Andrews, 1993).  Again, 
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politicians (and some economists) may take the view that the most urgent priority should be to 
establish the market system and not to worry too much in the early stages about its 
imperfections.  Once the system is established imperfections can be corrected in due course.  
Basically, such corrections are looked at as fine tuning, and are matters of subsidiary concern.  
Nevertheless, politically it may be important to give early consideration to building a socially 
responsible market economy, as Riha (1992) suggests. 
 
During the process of transition to a market economy, property rights may become fuzzy or 
uncertain.  This can result in those who control the use of such resources and who can benefit 
from their exploitation, accelerating their rate of exploitation for their own personal benefit.  
Moreover, relaxation of state control over resources can result in these becoming de facto open-
access property.  For example, reduced control by the central Russian government over the 
management of protected areas because of its shortages of finance has resulted in their illegal 
exploitation at the local level.   
In some transitional economies, the power of central government over local governments has 
diminished.  Apart from the problem mentioned above, this can result in local authorities 
permitting polluting activities which adversely affect neighbouring regions and thereby reduce 
overall national production or welfare.  This may, for example, have occurred in parts of China 
and Russia.  State enterprises in China are vocal in criticising town and village enterprises 
(which have been the major source of economic growth in China) as prospering at considerable 
expense to the natural environment (Cf. Tisdell, 1993).  While this could be a case of sour 
grapes, in transition the Chinese central government has been unable to exert much control over 
town and village enterprises.  Andrews (1993) found that in transition the central government of 
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Czechoslovakia devolved many of its powers to control the environment to local authorities.  
However, local authorities lacked the knowledge and the resources to undertake effective 
environmental management. 
 
Again, there is a risk of breakdown of law and order in transitionary economies as has occurred 
to a considerable extent in the former Soviet Union, because of the speed of the social change 
involved.  In addition, law reforms and the introduction of new laws do not always keep pace 
with the economic transformation of the economies involved.  As pointed out by Coase (1960), 
legal uncertainty can be a significant source of unfavourable externalities. 
 
At the same time as transition raises new environmental issues, transition can create new 
opportunities for controlling pollution, but opportunities that cannot always be taken advantage 
of immediately for the reasons indicated above.  Transition provides scope for establishing new 
sets of property rights and for ensuring that the management of production units obtain economic 
rewards which increase with the profitability of their unit.  Such rewards provide incentives to 
economise on natural resource-use and to adopt cost-saving innovations which indirectly result 
in greater output per unit of input and therefore are likely to reduce the pollution intensity of 
production.  Scope also emerges for using economic instruments to control pollution which had 
little or no role in a centrally planned system, especially in one which emphasises targets for 
quantities of output as prime goals.  Taxes or charges on pollution emissions become a policy 
option as do tradeable or marketable pollution permits.  Furthermore, managers are likely to take 
greater care with new investment to ensure that equipment installed is profitable and 
economically efficient.  Indirectly, this is likely to result in a fall in the intensity of pollution and 
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environment degradation but only in the long run.  Improvements in the operation of capital and 
finance markets will reinforce this effort. 
 
Even if market failures exist under a market system, it is to be expected that the market system 
will reduce the intensity of pollution (in comparison to a CPE for the same GDP), once it has 
been in operation for some time.  Nevertheless, the absolute level of pollution or environmental 
degradation need not be lower under a market system.  If for example, introduction of the market 
system results in greater economic growth in the long-term, the absolute level of pollution and 
environmental degradation may grow and even the intensity of pollution may rise as illustrated 
in Figure 1 by a movement from G to BΝ.  Note that absolute levels of pollution can even rise 
when pollution intensities fall as pointed out in Tisdell (1997). 
 
Applying the above to a CPE which successfully transits to a market economy, the former may 
achieve greater income growth as a result.  Both because of a more efficient economy and 
greater economic growth, its pollution intensity could eventually fall.  Nevertheless, its total 
contribution to pollution and environmental degradation can be expected to rise for some time as 
its income levels go up.  Where the pollutants involved are of global consequence, such as 
greenhouse gases, this can be expected to exacerbate global environmental problems, as in 
China=s case.  Thus, the conversion of CPEs to successful market economies (and bearing in 
mind that market economies are likely to be engines of economic growth given the stage of 
development of many CPEs) is likely to add to global environmental concerns, as for example 
has the economic growth of China. 
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Note that the Kuznets-type environmental curves used in this discussion should be cautiously 
interpreted even though they are useful for the purpose of exposition.  Considerable controversy 
for example is possible about how best to construct an environmental pollution and degradation 
index because a wide range of environmental variables are involved, and these may assume 
different degrees of relative importance to different people.  These difficulties, however, should 
not prevent us from thinking about these issues, particularly since national activities often have 
global environmental consequences. 
 
4. More Specific Observations on Environmental Problems in Transitional Economics 
Β Eastern and Central Europe, Russia and China 
The above discussion indicates that the transitional patterns and experiences of former CPEs are 
quite diverse and that the environmental consequences of their transition are varied.  Former 
CPEs for example differ in their industrial structures, the extent to which they have achieved 
economic growth and in the extent to which they have embraced democratic institutions 
involving pluralism.  Intriligator (1998) for instance identifies Czechoslovakia as having a 
democratic political system with a growing economy whereas Russia has a democratic system 
with a collapsing economy.  Both China and North Korea lack pluralist democratic systems.  The 
former has achieved outstanding economic growth and progressed significantly towards a market 
economy by gradual reform.  North Korea has made no progress towards transition and its 
economy seems to be collapsing or ailing severely.  The experience of the former German 
Democratic Republic is different again due to the reunification of Germany.  East Germany has 
been able to obtain considerable economic support from West Germany in its transition which 
has enabled closure of the most polluting enterprises in East Germany or counter-measures to be 
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taken.  Distinct improvements in the environment are occurring in East Germany but 
unemployment rates are relatively high by comparison with the rest of Germany. 
 
However, it ought to be noted that in the initial years of transition that Czechoslovakia did not 
display positive economic growth even though it has done so in recent years at variable rates 
(International Monetary Fund, 1998; p.58).  Poland has achieved greater economic growth 
(International Monetary Fund, 1998, p.129) than Czechoslovakia.  In part this economic growth 
has enabled such economies to restructure towards higher and less polluting industries and place 
more emphasis on the growth of service industries.  Such restructuring can significantly reduce 
pollution intensities.  Because of its lack of economic growth, Russia has not been able to 
restructure its economy significantly.  As Intriligator (1988, p.243) points out, there has been a 
collapse of domestic and foreign investment in Russia, along with capital flight for institutional 
reasons which he outlines.  This has not been the experience of Czechoslovakia and Poland 
which have attracted substantial foreign investment. 
 
It is clear that the economic order of any country depends on its governance structures and these 
to a large extent evolve from its national culture and level of economic development (Riha, 1992, 
p.172).  In turn, these factors help determine the way in which different economies manage their 
environment. 
 
In classifying economies, Riha (1992) utilises four attributes or characteristics,  namely the 
presence of (1) anarchy (2) central planning (3) competition involving a market/exchange 
economic order and (4) group control involving corporate imposed economic order.   Actually, 
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however, few if any, economies can be classified by just one of these single attributes.  Often a 
combination is present.  In communist countries, central planning and corporatism were 
frequently both present.  It is possible to get economics where elements of anarchy occur along 
with market systems.  Riha expresses a fear that some former CPEs will move from an ordered 
centrally planned economy towards anarchy in transition rather than smoothly towards a 
competitive market system.  In some cases, his fear has been borne out e.g. arguably in the case 
of Russia but not in the case of the Eastern and Central European former CPEs.  Anarchy seems 
unlikely now in the case of these Eastern European countries but transitional problems remain in 
some central European countries e.g. in Bulgaria, so one has to be cautious about predicting their 
political future.  The state of the environment, the economic performance of countries and the 
workings and nature of government structures are closely interrelated.  Shortcomings in any of 
the latter spheres are likely to adversely impact on the environment. 
 
It would be wrong to believe that the former CPEs gave no attention to the state of the 
environment.  But attention was often geographically >patchy=.  Furthermore, although 
environmental regulations were in place and on paper often looked to be excellent from the point 
of view of environmentalist,  incentives and means to ensure compliance with the regulations 
were not in place.  Many environmental problems  arose because of the relatively low level of 
economic development of the CPEs and their low levels of per capita income, which would have 
placed them towards the bottom of the Kuznets pollution/environmental degradation curve.  
Other environmental difficulties arose because the nature of the economic system itself.  
Russian-dominated CPEs had a number of factors which meant that environmental 
considerations were relatively neglected in planning economic activity. 
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Stalinism gave priority to the development of heavy industries (steel and metal industries, 
chemical and power), all of which were major sources of pollutants and held back the growth of 
light industry.  Furthermore, the service industries, which tend to have the lowest pollution 
intensities, were retarded on the traditional Marxist basis that they are unproductive.  The 
distorted sectoral composition was thus one factor making for a high pollution intensity in 
relation to production levels. 
 
The system was unable to take full advantage of the laws of comparative advantage and the 
scope for beneficial trade and exchange.  This resulted in high input-output ratios and greater use 
of locally available polluting material than otherwise was feasible.  High input-output ratios were 
a source of higher pollution intensities and of accelerated natural resources depletion.  High 
levels of investment and use of resources were used to compensate for allocative inefficiency, 
and the presence of obsolete or backward technologies. 
 
Marxist views long influenced policies on charging for the use of natural resources.  There was a 
tendency not to charge for their use, or to underprice their use.  This meant that they were not 
appropriately valued and were indiscriminately used as inputs in production and as sinks for 
pollution from industry.  User-pays and pollution-pays principles were not a part of CPE culture. 
So called economic branches dominated groups concerned with regional affairs and 
management. An element of corporatism was present.  Broad production plans tended to emanate 
from the centre, mostly from Moscow, and showed no or little sensitivity to local environmental 
problems.  Virtually no local communal input was possible.  The distance between the centre and 
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the localities or regions became as source of social and environmental insensitivity.  Often the 
environmental problems of one region spilt over to another, or the combination of the 
environmental impacts of several regions magnified their total regional impact.  Such issues 
were largely ignored or only begun to be considered seriously towards the end of the CPE 
system. 
 
Not only did the system have allocative and social shortcomings, but it was not a strong  source 
of invention, innovation and technological progress generally.  While not all new technology is 
necessarily environmentally friendlier than that of older vintage, it often is.  It is often for 
example input saving or cost saving or a product innovation may replace a product that is more 
material intensive than the new product.  If use of the environment and natural resources are 
appropriately priced, and factored into economic rewards such as profits, this encourages the 
development and adoption of environmentally friendlier technology.  These incentives were 
absent in the CPEs.  As Kallaste (1994, p.153) points out Αfor many years there was no 
significant incentives for investments in environmentally benign technologies or waste 
production equipment.≅ 
 
A further factor contributing to the continuation of serious environmental problems in the CPEs 
was the lack of freedom of the communication media and the absence of multiparty democratic 
government.  Thus, grassroots and regional political action to rectify these problems was stifled. 
 State-owned industrial firms were in a position to generate horrific environmental impacts with 
relative impunity.  The environmental problems generated were to a considerable extent due to 
the whole Stalinist-type system, not just purely economic aspects. 
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Nevertheless, there was some attention to environmental problems under communism in the 
Soviet Union.  In the 1970s Gosplan allowed for greater investment in the protection of water 
resources, mainly to deal with health problems, and various official committees were set up to 
consider environmental protection and make recommendations.  Considerable administrative and 
legal changes occurred for protection of the environment throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s.  But as Ählander (1994, p.79) observed, Αlaws and resolutions do not automatically 
achieve anything.  While production plans generally are accompanied by the allocation of 
resources required to fulfil them, regulations are not.  If necessary, inputs and technical 
equipment are not provided, even enterprises actually motivated to comply might not be able to 
do so.≅ 
 
In the early stages of transition in the Soviet Union, useful philosophies and tools for 
environmental management were identified as a part of perestroika which was intended as the 
cornerstone for environmental protection in the period 1991-2005, for Russia at least.  These 
tools were also adopted by some other members of the former Soviet bloc, e.g. Poland and 
Estonia. 
 
As elaborated on by Ählander (1994), these are:- 
(i) The use of (social) cost-benefit analysis for environmental decision making. 
(ii) The introduction of pollution charges and payments for using natural resources, such as 
water. 
(iii) The introduction of self financing systems for environmental protection measures taken 
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at the regional or national level. 
 
On the surface, the framework appeared to be an almost ideal one for addressing the type of 
environmental issues besetting the former CPEs.  However, cost-benefit analysis is mainly 
restricted to >objective= evaluation and used more widely at lower levels than at higher levels 
for environmental policy determination.  According to Ählander (1994), Αpayments for 
utilisation of natural resources such as land, water, forests and minerals, were introduced in 
1991" (p.74), and Αpollution charges were established for all principal pollutants emitted; air, 
water and solid wastes≅(p.75). 
 
Nevertheless, the mode of payment of fees (prices) for natural resources and pollution emissions 
were such as to provide no incentive for firms to economise on natural resource-use or on their 
emissions of pollutants.  This is because the fees were not paid out of the 30 per cent of a firm=s 
profit left for its discretionary use, but from the 70 per cent of profit payable to the State.  Thus 
the opportunity costs to an enterprise of paying these charges was zero.  It had no incentive to 
economise on its use of scarce natural and environmental resources, and this reduced the 
effectiveness of the scheme. 
 
These environmental charges were first imposed when enterprises were still operating under soft 
budgets.  But as transition proceeded, enterprises became subject to harder budget conditions.  
Countries in transition then often had to face the hard decision of whether to enforce such 
charges, with the likelihood of sending many enterprises bankrupt, or reducing these charges or 
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even waiving them altogether (Steenge, 1991).  In many cases, enforcement was not pursued or 
only partially so. 
 
China suffered from similar environmental problems to other CPEs before its transition.  
However, its process of gradual market reform was associated with rapid economic growth.  
While its rapid economic growth added to its visible environmental problems (Bingham, 1993; 
Tisdell, 1997), this growth also provided China with the means to begin to address its 
environmental problems.  With progress in market reforms, China has implemented a gradualist 
approach to reforming of its environmental policies.  It has drawn up its Agenda 21 (State 
Council, 1994) to provide it with a long-term strategies for environmental reform and sustainable 
development.  It also became committed to strengthening government administration of 
environmental controls and to greater use of the >polluter pays= principle to internalise pollution 
costs which would otherwise be external to organisations.  In utilising systems of economic 
incentives for pollution control, China has employed gradualistic learning policies e.g. pollution 
charges are sometimes levied in a particular region as a pilot-case and the coverage is extended if 
the policy is considered to be successful and/or the policy is modified.  The approach is a 
pragmatic one.  It should however be observed that China, unlike other former CPEs was 
fortunate in having town and village enterprises to provide it with considerable economic growth 
and postpone reforms of state enterprises.  The major test for China may be just around the 
corner, since plans are to increasingly privatise state enterprises  and so force these enterprises to 
 shift from soft to hard budgets (Cf. Tisdell and Chai, 1998).  This is a problem which China has 
been able to defer until now but not other CPEs.  Pollution charges will have a greater economic 
impact once greater privatisation of state enterprises occurs. 
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5. Concluding Comments 
One of the conclusions from the above is that while the environmental situations of most CPEs 
were similar before they started their processes of transformation, in transition their situations 
have become  divergent mainly because of differences in their approaches to transition and 
because of variations in their economic experiences e.g. different rates of economic growth, 
economic decline or otherwise.  These divergencies may reflect to some extent differences in the 
cultural heritage of former CPEs.  Although cultural differences were weakened under 
communist regimes, they were never entirely eliminated.  Varied transitional paths and degrees 
of economic success or otherwise of former CPEs in transition may well reflect cultural and 
historical differences.  With the passage of time, varied economic and social experiences of 
CPEs in transition have had differing consequences for their success and failures in protecting 
their environments.  Furthermore, their choice of environmental management methods appears to 
have been shaped by similar factors. 
 
No special mention has been made of the environmental difficulties of African countries 
experiencing transition such as Ethiopia and Tanzania.  But these countries have also had to cope 
with considerable economic and social adjustment.  So have other African countries, such as 
Zimbabwe, which were not really socialist but which did have a considerable degree of 
government involvement in their economies.  The IMF and the World Bank have made the 
adoption of structural adjustment policies by these countries a condition of their financial 
support.  Compliance means that their government sector is to be kept small, free markets are to 
be used extensively with the user-pays principle widely adopted and international trade and 
capital movements are to be liberalised so that the countries concerned become outward-looking 
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rather than inward-looking in their economic affairs Β they become integrated with the 
globalising world economy.  It is a tune to which most transitional economies are trying to 
dance, as well as many former welfare states with mixed economic systems!  While the 
advocates of structural adjustment policies sometimes seem to promise Utopian results, the 
social risks involved in adopting such policies are enormous.  They have considerable capacity 
to create economic inequality, social inequity and economic insecurity. 
 
Some of the advocates of structural adjustment policies see these as environmentally friendly 
and beneficial to conservation (Sebastian Alicebusan, 1989).  In reality, however, their 
performance in this regard is likely to be mixed (Mearns, 1991; Tisdell, 1994).  To the extent 
that small government means that public conservation bodies such as national park and wildlife 
services are starved of public funds, this is unfavourable to nature conservation.  Furthermore, 
insofar as such bodies are forced to raise funds by their own commercial means, this can 
compromise conservation goals.  For example, in China conservation officers sometimes provide 
commercial concessions in  protected areas e.g. concessions to enterprises to grow fruit, in order 
to supplement their low incomes and this can compromise the nature conservation objectives for 
protected areas (Tisdell, 1998).  Similar examples are no doubt available from Africa.  
Zimbabwe in recent years has extended private and  commercial ownership of wildlife e.g. using 
its CAMPFIRE program, but private ownership is not sufficient to ensure conservation 
biodiversity (Tisdell, 1998).  The potential for private ownership to conserve biodiversity has 
been greatly overrated by some wildlife managers and ecologists with little grounding in 
environmental or ecological economics. 
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It is important to note, before concluding, that two alternative ideals for a market economy have 
been presented to transitional economies. These are:- 
(i) the laissez-faire type of market economy inherent in the structural adjustment policies 
promoted by the IMF and the World Bank Β the so called American model typified in the 
past by the Chicago School of Economics; and  
(ii) the social market economy model favouring a socially responsible market order 
responsive to the basic needs of citizens.  Some government intervention in markets is 
claimed to be needed for equity and economic efficiency reasons as well as for reasons of 
economic/social security.  This view has been strongly represented in German economic 
thought (Riha, 1992; Böhm, 1950; Eucken, 1952).  The >German= model is an 
alternative to the >American= one for  economies in transition. 
 
Ironically not even the United States follows the laissez-faire market model.  For example the 
U.S. government definitely intervenes in the market system to prevent recessive environmental 
deterioration, even though it is increasingly trying to do this by means of economic incentives 
rather than by using command and control methods.  Despite the shortcomings and failures of 
governments, they have  an important social role to play in market economies.  Economies in 
transition need to clarify the role of government early in the process of their transition.  They 
need to be clear about the desired speed and nature of government withdrawal from economic 
activity as well as the ultimate role for government in a transformed economy.  Rapid 
government withdrawal without appropriate institution-building can have disastrous economic 
consequences, as the Russian case illustrates, not only for the state of the environment but for the 
social welfare of all concerned.  Possibly, the Russian result was not one expected by those 
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American economic theorists who seemed convinced that >big-bang= conversion of the Russian 
economy to a laissez-faire type economy was the answer for Russia.  The more pragmatic and 
gradual approach of China to reform and also, to some extent, of the Central and Eastern 
European countries has in hindsight paid dividends.  For example, the IMF (1998) continues still 
to complain that too many enterprises in the Czech Republic remain under state ownership so in 
its view the Czech Republic=s transition has not been rapid enough. 
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